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Credit sharing information mechanisms represent the institutional answer to the asymmetric 
information problems inherent to credit markets. It is generally accepted that sharing 
information is beneficial for the participant institutions, however, there are few studies that 
have measured the impact of past behavioral information on risk analysis. Applying a 
Probit model to the micro level database gathered by the Mexican Public Registry of Credit 
Information we find that historical variables, like previous defaults and previous missing 
payments are highly significant in explaining the probability of default. In particular, 
having defaulted a loan in the past, increases current loan’s default probability in 30 
percentage points. We also find that the longer the borrower has been in the market and the 
larger the loan, the less likely it is that the current loan will be defaulted on. Additionally, 
we measure the effects of macroeconomic fluctuations over individual loans’ probability of 
default; we find that inflation significantly increases it while economic growth reduces it. 
Our results imply that effort should be exerted to develop more complete databases on 
individuals’ past behavior. This is particularly relevant in the Latin American context were 
the credit sharing industry is not very developed. 
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1. Introduction 
It is well known that credit markets suffer from asymmetric information problems. When a 
loan is granted, the lender faces adverse selection since it does not know the borrower’s 
intrinsic risk level. Once the loan is provided, the lender faces moral hazard given that it 
cannot perfectly monitor borrower’s efforts to repay the loan. Given these information 
constraints, lenders make loans decisions based on applicants’ average characteristics 
(Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976). This gives place to a worsening of payment likelihood and 
to higher interest rates. Higher rates increase adverse selection because only high risk 
borrowers will be willing to take them  (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). 
Coordination between lenders by sharing credit information alleviates asymmetric 
information problems. This is the function of sharing mechanisms, whether they are Public 
Registries of Credit Information (PRCI) or private credit bureaus. These institutions collect, 
organize and consolidate information on borrowers’ past behavior; such information 
emerges from the interaction of PRCI associated banks with their respective clients. 
Sharing mechanisms use this information to build credit reports on individuals, which they 
provide to lenders. Sharing information has two positive effects on information problems. 
On the one hand, it mitigates adverse selection by allowing lenders to identify potential 
clients’ characteristics. On the other, it alleviates moral hazard by providing incentives to 
borrowers to fulfill their credit obligations
1. These positive effects explain that the industry 
of credit reporting has expanded rapidly in many countries, including Mexico. 
Lenders’ coordination is based on the principal that a borrower’s past credit behavior is a 
good indication of its current and future actions. This seems obvious; however, there is 
little empirical evidence that this is the case. The main goal of this paper is to measure to 
what extent a borrower’s past behavior affects its default likelihood on current loans. 
Although me cannot separate the moral hazard and adverse selection effects of information 
sharing, we quantify the impact of past borrower behavior on her current credit 
performance . 
                                                 
1 Padilla y Pagano (1997) call this the  disciplinary effect of information sharing.  
  2For this study we use the individual-loan level database from the Mexican PRCI. 
Membership in the PRCI is compulsory for all banks in the Mexican financial system; 
hence the database covers all loans provided by Mexican financial institutions. The 
database allows us to design an array of historical variables that describe borrowers’ past 
behavior, such as past defaults, past delays, past loan restructures, length of borrowers’ 
participation in the credit market and borrowers’ consolidated debt (within the banking 
system). Although the database does not include balance sheet information- usually 
considered as the most  important determinants of credit risk- it allows us to construct 
proxy variables for such information. Hence, we analyze the relevance of historical 
variables on the probability of default (PD) controlling for balance sheet information. Our 
estimation uses a dichotomous dependent variable (Probit) model.  
We find that information on borrowers past behavior is crucial in PD determination. In 
particular, having previous defaults increases PD in 30 percentage points. The relative 
importance of this number can be properly seen by considering that the average estimated 
PD is 3.97%. Similarly, previous delays and past loan restructures significantly increase 
PD. On the other hand, length of participation in the credit market reduces PD, as 
consolidated debt and current loan amount do. Interestingly, collateral has little significance 
in PD determination. This may be due to the legal limitations on the recovery of collateral 
associated with nonperforming loans. Finally, we find that at the microeconomic level, 
inflation significantly increases PD while economic growth reduces it. This finding is 
relevant because it stresses that a healthy credit system needs of a stable macroeconomic 
environment. 
Our results fit in the literature started by Chandler and Parker (1989) and extended by 
Barron and Staten (2002) and Kallberg and Udell (2002). Chandler and Park use a credit 
scoring model to test the effect on credit ratings of applications information versus credit 
bureau information. They find that credit bureau information predicts borrowers’ credit risk 
better. Barron and Staten (2002) also use credit scoring and a simulation mechanism to 
analyze the influence of positive and negative information on availability of credit to 
households. They conclude that more information mitigates credit constraints. Kallberg and 
Udell (2002) introduce an index that summarizes borrowers’ credit history in a logistic 
model to show that voluntary information sharing is useful in determining default.  
  3The contributions of this study are the following. Firstly, the quantification of the effect of 
past behavior variables in the context of an emerging economy has important policy 
implications for the performance of credit institutions. It is very likely that one of the 
reasons for the limited importance of credit in Mexico has been the lack of information. 
Secondly, the design of several variables that describe borrowers’ past behavior allows us 
to add precise effects to the findings of Kallberg and Udell and Barron and Staten. Thirdly, 
our estimations are based on information from a PRCI of compulsory participation, as 
opposed to the voluntary interchanges of Kallberg and Udell (2002). We show that even 
non-voluntary sharing is useful to determine default
2. Finally, the measurement of the effect 
of macroeconomic fluctuations on default probability at the microeconomic level is a 
contribution to the literature.  
This paper is structured as follows. The second section reviews the related literature. The 
third presents a conceptual description of the database and variable design and of the Probit 
model. In the forth section we present the data description. The fifth section includes the 
estimation results. The sixth section discusses some policy issues and concludes. 
 
2.  Related literature 
Asymmetric information in credit markets increase PD and negatively affects the granting 
of credit. The institutional answer to these problems has been the formation of mechanisms 
by means of which banks share information on borrowers’ past credit behavior. Sharing 
mechanisms, whether they are private credit bureaus or PRCI, gather, organize and 
consolidate information on borrowers provided by associated banks
3. The bureau then 
forms credit reports and sends the consolidated information back to the banks upon 
request
4. There have been three strands of literature related to information sharing. The first 
one is theoretical, the second is empirical at the macro level and third one is also empirical 
but at the micro level. This study fits in the latter strand. 
                                                 
2 It could be thought that forcing credit institutions to participate would reduce the quality of the information 
reported. 
3 Although our research uses information from a public registry, the analysis is valid for private mechanisms. 
We sometimes refer indistinctly to the mechanism as PRCI or as bureau. 
4 See Negrin (2001) for a detailed description of the way sharing mechanisms work. 
  4Despite the benefits involved in sharing credit information, not all countries have such 
sharing institutions
5. Furthermore, the origin and development of these institutions around 
the world has not been unique. Sometimes the sharing mechanism has a private, 
spontaneous, and voluntary origin, like many credit bureaus. In other cases, financial 
authorities start a PRCI; these institutions usually have coverage that is restricted to 
financial institutions, whose participation in the mechanism is compulsory
6. In these cases, 
private bureaus have often entered markets not covered by the PRCI. In yet other cases, 
financial authorities have started PRCI even though there already were private bureaus in 
the market (Miller, 2000). 
In terms of the willingness of lenders to share information, Pagano and Jappelli (1993) find 
that sharing is more likely to occur the larger the population, the greater the level of 
mobility and the more heterogeneous the individuals are
7. A related aspect that affects 
sharing decision is provided by Jappelli (1997) and Padilla and Jappelli (1997). They claim 
that when there is less competition among lenders, information sharing is more feasible 
since participants have not fear of loosing their good clients
8. 
The information that is shared could be negative (overdue payments, defaults and frauds) or 
it could also include positive information (for instance, good payment behavior in the past, 
current debt that is being paid and payment patterns). The type of information shared has 
effects both on borrowers’ and lenders’ behavior. Lenders are more willing to share 
negative information than positive information. Sharing negative information helps lenders 
to identify high risk borrowers. However, sharing positive information may reduce the rents 
that lenders can extract from the good clients that they have already identified.
9 
                                                 
5 See Jappelli and Pagano (1999), Miller (2000) and Negrin (2001). 
6 In the voluntary participation case, Klein (1992) studies the decision to subscribe to the mechanism. A 
different approach is taken by Pagano and Jappelli (1993); they consider that once a significant proportion of 
firms has joined the mechanism, all the others will soon follow. 
7 Klein (1992) states that credit bureaus in “the Great Society” play the role of gossip in smaller communities; 
hence, sharing information mechanisms only emerge in large enough societies. 
8 Even though sharing may intensify competition between lenders, Padilla and Pagano (1997) find that such 
harsher competition may have a desirable effect for lenders, in addition to the enhancement of borrowers 
discipline. They claim that, given that competition disallows informational rents, borrowers perform better 
because they perceive that the lender is not appropriating all the benefits of their effort to repay their loans. 
9 Padilla and Pagano (1999) claim that sharing negative and positive information may have an undesirable 
effect on borrowers behavior. Revealing just negative information imposes discipline on debtors; in this case, 
information on the payments missed is the only signal of bad risks that lenders receive. When positive 
information is shared,  the lending decision is based not just on negative information, but also on other 
  5Consequently, some countries’ financial authorities, like Australia, have restricted the 
interchange to negative information.  
Apart from these theoretical analyses, there is a strand of literature oriented to measure the 
effects of information sharing on the amounts of credit at the economy wide level. Miller 
(2000) and Jappelli and Pagano (1999) perform international comparisons of the 
mechanisms to share information. Jappelli and Pagano (1999) perform a cross country 
study to find that sharing information mechanisms have positive effects on aggregate credit 
provision. A similar approach, although based on data on firms listed in the stock market of 
the corresponding country, is followed by Galindo and Miller (2001) to show that sharing 
mechanisms are useful to mitigate credit constraints. 
The third literature strand studies the effect that the information collected by the credit 
bureaus has on current loans performance at the microeconomic level. Our research fits in 
this strand. Chandler and Parker (1989) use a credit scoring model to test the effect on 
credit ratings of applications information (age, employment information, income, 
dependents, other debts, banks relationships, etc.) versus credit bureau information (number 
of reports on debtors, debtor rating, operations, credit line use, debtor number of accounts, 
etc.). They find that the latter predicts borrowers’ credit risk better. Barron and Staten 
(2002) also use credit scoring and a simulation mechanism to analyze the influence of 
positive and negative information on households’ credit availability. They conclude that the 
more information, the lesser the credit constraints; hence, it is useful to include positive 
information. Kallberg and Udell (2002) introduce an index that summarizes borrowers’ 
credit history in a logistic model to show that voluntary information sharing is useful in 
determining default.  
This article is related to the latter literature strand in that it uses microeconomic information 
to determine risk. However, our particular design of the variables that describe past 
behavior allows us to measure the impact of these variables on current performance, adding 
variety and precision to the literature (see Barron and Staten (2002) and Chandler and Park 
(1989)). The use of information from a compulsory participation sharing mechanism, as 
opposed to the voluntary sharing of Kallberg and Udell (2002), makes the results 
                                                                                                                                                     
elements (positive information); hence, the incentives that borrowers receive to never miss payments 
deteriorate. 
  6particularly relevant for those countries that have a public registry of credit information. 
Finally, the measurement of the effect of economy wide fluctuations on default at loan level 
is an extension to the existing literature. 
3.   Methodology 
3.1 The database 
The database comes from the Mexican PRCI (Senicreb), founded in 1964 and still run by 
the Central Bank today. The PRCI was originally conceived as an aid to the supervision of 
bank compliance with directed credit regulation, by monitoring the allocation of credit to 
different economic sectors, and by providing aggregate statistics on the financial system. 
The provision of credit reports to banks was a secondary service. Moreover, the 
measurement of credit risk was not contemplated originally. Senicreb collects monthly data 
from banks and other financial institutions for which it is compulsory to provide this 
information
10. All loans over 200,000 pesos are registered individually.
11 The database 
includes loan identification (borrower’s tax number, name, address), economic sector, 
State, currency denomination, loan amount, loan type, loan situation (performing or not), 
consolidated debt (only within the financial system) and loan rating. From its creation until 
1995, Senicreb was practically the only credit information institution in Mexico
12; however, 
with the financial liberalization and the consequent credit expansion of the early nineties, a 
private credit bureau has entered the market, displacing Senicreb as a provider of reports. 
Nevertheless, Senicreb has continued to gather information for regulatory purposes. 
The original database includes all the loans provided by Mexican banks from January 1997 
to November 2002 (71 months). However, for this analysis we restricted the data to loans 
provided by commercial banks to the private sector; that is, we exclude loans provided by 
development (public) banks and loans received by the different levels of government (from 
any source). It is important to notice that our analysis is performed at the loan level rather 
                                                 
10 Other non-bank lending institutions are not part of Senicreb. To assess the importance of Senicreb’s 
database in terms of the fraction of all credit information that it contains, it is enough to notice that for 1997, 
banks provided around 2/3 of all loans to the private sector. Even though that proportion has fallen in recent 
years, banks still provided over 40% of total loans to the private sector in 2003. 
11 This threshold leaves out consumption loans, such as credit cards. Loans below that limit are reported in 
aggregated form, but were excluded from the sample. It is interesting that some banks report loans smaller 
than 200,000 pesos individually; if they were reported individually they were included in the sample. 
12 Previous to 1995, there were several private attempts to share credit information, but they failed (See 
Negrin, 2001). 
  7than at the borrower level because we are interested in individual loan performance. Each 
borrower, whatever its history, may have several loans and may not perform equally in all 
of them. Our database includes both loans to firms and to individuals or households. As 
mention below, the only loans to households that we consider are mortgages. However, 
mortgages represent around half of the loans included in the final sample.
13  
We determine the PD over a one-year horizon; that is, we follow the performance of each 
new loan for 12 months in order to determine whether or not it was defaulted on.
14 Hence, 
it is necessary to identify first the new loans provided at any specific point in time, and then 
track their payment history through the year in order to register if any of them defaulted. A 
new loan is one for which no information was reported in the 3 previous months. If there 
were loans that at the beginning of the period of study were already reporting, they were 
not considered new and were not included in the sample. 
Another filter to identify new loans was provided by the “loan rating” information. The 
database includes a rating for a number of the loans because the regulation requires banks 
to rate a certain proportion of their portfolios. The rating system is set by the National 
Banking Commission (CNBV).
15 Rates range from A to E (five levels), where A is the 
highest rating and E corresponds to non-performing loans; the only criteria for rate 
deterioration is the increase in the number of missing payments. Given that we are only 
including new loans, it would be incongruous to keep loans that already register missed 
payments. Hence, we eliminated from the database all the loans that had a rating different 
than A
16. We also kept in the data base the loans that were not rated. 
Once the loan was identified as new, we needed to follow its performance for the next 12 
months in order to see if it had defaulted or not. Although our database does not include a 
default definition, it identifies the months in which a borrower missed a payment. We 
adopted the following default criterion: a loan was consider defaulted if it had missed 3 
                                                 
13 It is feasible that loans to firms and to households have a different set of determinants; hence, it is likely 
that historical variables affect them differently. We test this hypothesis in one of our exercises. 
14 The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (1999) indicates that this is a common bank practice. This 
method is also followed in the new capital proposal (see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2001b). 
15 Banks could use internal ratings if they comply with certain regulations. See CNBV circulars 1480, 1460 
and 1499. 
16 Only around 40% of the loans identified as new were rated. 
  8consecutive payments (90 days) within a year.
17 This criterion was adopted by the Basle 
Committee on Banking Supervision (2001a) for the application of the internal rating 
approach. Also, Barron and Staten (2002) use the same criterion although their estimation 
of PD is over a two year horizon. This system of measuring performance means that the last 
batch of new loans in our sample was identified in November of 2001. 
Similarly, to determine borrowers’ past credit behavior we need to build their history. 
Hence, we need to follow the history of all borrowers, looking back from the moment when 
they are identified as receiving a new loan. We consider at least one year of history for each 
borrower holding a new loan. Consequently, the first batch of new loans that we identified 
was provided in January of 1998. We then constructed historic variables by following the 
borrower’s past performance in previous loans. The variables included are: borrowers’ past 
defaults, borrowers’ past payment delays, borrowers’ past restructures and borrowers’ past 
renewals
18. From our database, we also design a variable that indicates borrower’s length of 
participation in the credit market and a variable that shows borrower’s consolidated debt
19.  
At this point it is useful to summarize the filters we used to form our database. Firstly, we 
only included loans provided by commercial banks to private firms or individuals. 
Secondly, we only included loans that we identified as new; that is, al loans that were 
already running at our starting point (January 1997) were excluded. Additionally, all loans 
that passed our criteria of new, but had a rating different than A were excluded. Thirdly, the 
loans included needed to have at least 12 months of life; loans with shorter maturities were 
excluded. Fourthly, the loans that in their 12 months of life, interrupted their reports for 
more than two months, were excluded from the database. 
Table 3.1 presents a list of the variables included in the database, their characteristics and 
the expected effect on default probability. The list of economic activities is reported in 
Appendix 2. Bank names are excluded for secrecy reasons. The loan currency 
                                                 
17 It is important to mention that some loans in our original database presented a continuity problem. That is, 
some banks failed to report the performance of a particular loans during a certain month of set of months, and 
resume reporting them at a later period. The loans that exhibited this lack of continuity for two or more 
periods within a year were excluded from the sample. 
18 It is interesting to notice that by design, some loans may have a longer history than others, depending on the 
moment when they were identified as new. We do not consider that his introduces any bias to our estimation 
because it affects the same performing and non-performing loans. 
19 Each time a loan is identified as new, we check if the corresponding borrower had previous market 
participations. If the borrower did, then we count the time from the first participation to the time of the current 
loan. 
  9denomination could be pesos, dollars or Units of Investment (UDIS) pegged to the CPI. 
Although all historic variables are straight forward, some other variables included in the 
table need further explanation.  
Table 3.1 




Dummy  D=1 means default, 0 otherwise   
Debtor location  Dummy  1 per each of 32 Estates  Uncertain
Debtor economic activity  Dummy  1 dummy per each of 22 economic activities (see Apendix2)  Uncertain
Bank that provides loan  Dummy  1 dummy per each of 36 banks  Uncertain
Currency denomination  Dummy  3 dummies: national, foreign, and UDIS (indexed to inflation)  Uncertain
Collateral  Dummy  D=1 if there is collateral, D=0 otherwise  (-) 
Initial loan amount  Continuous  From 0 to 25,000,000 pesos  Uncertain
Interest rate (loan specific)  Continuous  Ratio of interest paid to loan amount. Reported for 54% of the 
loans 
(+) 
Consolidated debt   Continuous  Aggregated debt of the same borrower with the whole banking 
system at the beginning of the current loan 
Uncertain
First participation in 
financial market 
Discrete  Number of months since the borrower had a loan for the first 
time to the starting date of the current loan 
(+) 
Previous defaults   Dummy  D=1if there were previous defaults, D=0 otherwise  (-) 
Previous missing payments   Dummy  D=1if there were previous missing payments, D=0 otherwise  (-) 
Previous restructured loans   Dummy  D=1if there were previous restructures, D=0 otherwise  (-) 
Previous renewed loans   Dummy  D=1if there were previous renewals, D=0 otherwise  (+) 
Inflation Continuous  Measured  by monthly change in CPI   (+) 
Aggregated growth  Continuous  Economy monthly growth rate measured by industrial activity 
index 
(-) 
Economy wide interest rate  Continuous  Measured by monthly  change TIIE 28  (+) 
Month of loan origination  Discrete  From 1 to 47  Uncertain
 
The variable collateral indicates if a loan had guarantees. Although there is no direct 
information on collateral in our database, there is an indicator on the type of loan. This 
allows us to identify the existence or lack there-off of guarantees. Of the 13 loan types
20 
contemplated in the original database, the following were considered to have collateral: 
loans identified directly as collateralized, loans with a deposit certificate, loans with 
industrial guarantees, loans for the acquisition of raw materials, loans to buy machinery or 
directed to factory repair and maintenance, mortgages, housing loans, and other loans with 
real estate guarantees. Those considered as non-guaranteed loans are: discount loans (the 
bank gets a written payment commitment), direct loans, simple loans in current accounts 
and consumer loans.
21 A limitation of this variable is that it does not allow for fractional 
guarantees: it takes the value of 1 if there is collateral and 0 otherwise. It is important to 
                                                 
20 Observations where the type of loan was missing were dropped from the sample. 
21 Due to the high loan threshold, consumer loans are excluded. 
  10notice that in the case of Mexico, loan guarantees may be a secondary consideration for 
loan providers, due to the cumbersome and inefficient process of recovery of collateral 
associated with non performing loans
22. 
The variable interest rate needs explanation for conceptual and practical reasons. 
Conceptually, the interest rate charged on a loan could summarize all information a bank 
has about a borrower. If after analyzing this information, the bank considers that the 
likelihood of repayment is low, it will assign the loan a high interest rate. Given that most 
of the information that banks have about a borrower is balance sheet information (both, in 
the case of firms and people), it is likely that interest rates would summarize it
23. Hence, we 
used it as proxy variable for balance sheet information. This assumes that the interest rate 
variable does not include information on borrower’s history. 
Interest rates are not reported directly in the original database. The data only registers the 
amounts paid as interest on a monthly basis. We obtained interest rate per loan by 
averaging the monthly ratio of interest amount paid to current debt, over the life of the loan. 
It is necessary to mention that only 54% of the loans reported interest rates payments. In 
this case we left the unreported rates as zero because there are many arrangements to pay 
back a loan, like paying the whole debt –principal plus interests- at maturity or discounting 
the interests from the loan at the beginning
24.  
The variable initial loan amount allows us to separate firms according to their size, 
provided that loan amount is directly proportional to firm size. Firm size could also be used 
as a proxy variable for some balance sheet information, like sales. We generate two dummy 
variables to separate large from small firms, based on 500,000 and 750,000 pesos 
thresholds of initial loan amount, respectively. It is important to mention that we set a 
maximum initial loan amount of 25 million pesos to get rid of outliers
25.  
                                                 
22 The head of the Bankers Association declared in 2000 that, with the bankruptcy laws in place at the time, it 
would take from 8 to 10 years to recover collateral in Mexico (Héctor Rangel Domene, declared to the daily 
“La crónica de hoy”, 27/IV/2002). Although such law was revamped in 2001 recovery problems persist. 
23 Since the Altman (1968) paper on bankruptcy prediction, there have been many papers on the relevance of 
financial variables in default determination. Recent references on the relevance of financial and non-financial 
variables in internal credit ratings are Grunert, et al (2002) and Hayden (2003).  
24 We also tried assigning the average interest rate to the missing rate observations but it did not alter our 
estimation significantly. 
25 This meant the exclusion of 2,614 loans. Among them there were 691 loans of over 100 million pesos. 
  11Finally, we included inflation and growth variables in our estimations to control for the 
macroeconomic environment (in the case of these variables, the inflation or growth rate is 
the same for all loans current at each moment in time). Inflation was calculated as the 
monthly change in the consumer price index (CPI) while growth was obtained as the 
monthly change in the  industrial production index. We also used an economy wide interest 
rate given that many loans did not report a particular interest rate
26. As with inflation, we 
took the monthly changes in interest rate as a control variable.   
 
3.2 The Probit model 
We use a Probit model to estimate the PD. In these models, the dependent variable is 
dichotomous, taking the value of “1” when the loan defaulted and “zero” when it remained 
performing.
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where 
B
i D are dummy variables for the i banks;  
E
j D are dummy variables for the j economic sectors; 
C
k D are dummy variables for the k currencies of loan denomination; 
                                                 
26 Notice that this rate is different than the loan specific rate derived from within our database. In this case, the 
same interest rate was assigned to all the loans provided at the same time. We used the 28 days interbank 
equilibrium interest rate (TIIE) as the basis of our calculations. This rate is determined by Banco de México 
based on information provided by credit institutions. 
27 For a full explanation of the Probit model see among many others Maddala, (1983). 
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l D  are dummy variables for the l geographical regions;  
S H  is the matrix of historical variables (past defaults, past missing payments, past 
renewals, past restructures, time of participation in the banking system and consolidated 
debt);  
Z    is the set of all other positive variables (initial rating, initial debt amount, collateral, and 
interest rate). This could be considered positive information (Barron and Staten, 2002). 
It is important to point out that the coefficients obtained from the Probit model are not 
susceptible to direct interpretation and must be transformed in order to obtain the usual 
marginal effects.
28 The coefficients that we report in the tables of results are already 
transformed and can be interpreted as marginal effects. Given that the models are non-
linear, the coefficients should be interpreted as the change in the probability of default due 
to a change in the corresponding variable, assuming that all other independent variables are 
fixed at their mean values. It is also important to mention that all models were corrected for 
heteroskedasticity.
29 Finally, we reported the goodness of fit estimators appropriate for the 
dependent dichotomous variable, in the presence of heteroskedasticity.
30  
 
4.   Data description   
The sample database contains 90,805 new loans of which 3,588 defaulted on (4.0%). In 
broad terms, the average initial amount per loan was 1,147,907 pesos
31; however, if we 
partition the sample into deciles, the average initial loan amount for the first 9 deciles (84, 
143 loans) was 524,812 pesos, while the average loan amount of the last decile (6,662 
leans) was 9,017,766 pesos.
32 Although the average consolidated debt per borrower across 
the banking system was 5,806,207 pesos, the average consolidated debt of the first nine 
deciles was only 3,318,142 pesos while that of the last decile was over 37,231,200 pesos.  
                                                 
28 See Green, 2000. 
29 Appendix 3 presents the estimated Probit model corrected for heteroskedasticity. It presents also the 
mechanism to obtain the marginal effects in the presence of heteroskedasticity.  
30 Appendix 4 presents a brief explanation of the goodness of fit measures that we report in the tables. 
31 The exchange rate at the time of the last month included in the sample (November of 2002) was 10.12 
pesos per US dollar. For the data that appears in pesos in the rest of the section it is useful to just divide it 
over 10 to obtain a close approximation of its amount in dollar terms. 
32 Recall that we excluded loans over 25 million pesos. 
  13Of the total loans, almost 60% had some form of collateral. In 6.5% of the loans, the holder 
had a history of non performing loans in the system, while in 3.6% of the credits the holder 
had missed payments in previous loans. Only 1.1% and 1.6% had previous restructures and 
renewals, respectively. With respect to non-performing loans, in 84% of them the holder 
had had non-performing loans in the past, and in 36.2% the holder had missed payments in 
previous loans. Half of non-performing loans had collateral (See Table A.1 in Appendix 1). 
The average interest rate for the loans that reported it was 2.41% (a 28.92% yearly rate)
33. 
The average interest rate for the loans that defaulted was 4.27% (a yearly rate of 51.2%). 
This may reflect the fact that lenders may have known the credit history of their clients 
since they seemed to have assigned a higher rate to lenders with bad credit history
34. 
With respect to previous participation in the credit market, it is likely that current borrowers 
that participated before would have a lower PD than new borrowers since they have already 
enjoyed credit benefits and would not want to lose them.
35 In our sample more than 76.9% 
of the loans were received by new market participants, while 23.1% of the loans were 
provided to borrowers with previous market experience. Of the loans that defaulted, 19.7% 
had had previous market experience (See Appendix 1 Table A.2).  
In terms of currency denomination,  66.7% of the total loans were denominated in pesos, 
24.6% in “investment units” (UDIS) and  8.7% in dollars. Of the loans that defaulted 
almost 91.7% was denominated in pesos, while 8.1% were provided in dollars (See 
Appendix 1 Table A.3).  
The database indicates high loan concentration in terms of source, geographical region and 
economic activity. Only 6 banks provided almost 86% of the loans provided, while 65% of 
the total number of loans was directed to only 5 States (See Appendix 1, Tables A.4 and 
A.6). Regarding the borrowers’ economic activity, 75.2% of all loans were provided to 5 
                                                 
33 Only 53% of the total loans reported interest rate payments. 
34 In 1998, financial authorities issued a regulation that forced banks to obtain the corresponding report on 
applicant’s past behavior, before providing a loan. The regulation indicates that the bank that does not consult 
such report, has to provision that credit at the highest level. It is interesting that even after this regulation was 
issued, the data shows that banks still provided loans to people that had a bad history. Hence, banks must have 
provisioned these loans much higher than those that had no bad history. It is also interesting that the interest 
rate reported on loans received by borrowers with bad history was considerably higher than the average rate. 
See CNBV circulars 1413 (September 30, 1998), 1476 (August 16, 2000) and 1503 (August 14, 2001) for the 
original regulation and further modifications. 
35 Similarly, borrowers with longer credit histories would have a lower default rate. 
  14activities; in particular, 51.8% of the loans in the sample were mortgages. It is interesting to 
notice that housing has the lowest default rate (3.1%) whereas agriculture has the highest 
(8.3%). (See Appendix 1 Table A.5) 
To conclude this section, Table 4.1 contains the basic statistics of the variables included in 
the estimations. These data are relevant because the Probit model is non-linear; hence, the 
probabilities of default are calculated at the corresponding variable mean value. 
Table 4.1 
Variable Mean  Standard  Dev.  Max  Min 
Dependent Variable: Actual Default  0.0395 0.1948  1  0 
Original rating  2.1822 1.3359  3  0 
Guarantees and collateral  0.6045 0.4890  1  0 
Initial loan amount *  1147.91 2738.79  25000  1 
Interest rate**  0.0127 0.0437  1  0 
Consolidated debt with banking system*  5806.2 361018 41600000  1 
Participation in the credit system   3.3378 8.7250  66  0 
Previous missing payments with system  0.0650 0.2465  1  0 
Previous restructured loans in the system  0.0108 0.1033  1  0 
Previous renewed loans with system  0.0156 0.1240  1  0 
Previous missing payments with system  0.0443 0.2483  5  0 
Monthly inflation rate  0.0080 0.0063  0.0253 0 
Monthly change in interest rate (TIIE 28)   -0.0029 0.1197  0.6307  0 
Monthly output growth rate  -0.0022 0.0412  0.1054  0 
Month of loan origination  21.549 13.6375  47  4 
* Thousands of current pesos.             
** Average rate for all loans, including the loans that did not report a rate. 
 
5.   Estimations and Results 
In this section we present the estimation results. We show first the importance of historical 
variables on PD determination in a reference model. Then, we study the relevance of 
historic variables under different scenarios and, finally, we test several secondary 
hypothesis. Among them, we test the effect of technological change on PD determination, 
the relevance of the regulation on information usage, the effect of inflation and aggregate 
growth and whether historical variables affect commercial and personal (mortgages) loans 
differently. The coefficients reported in all the tables in this section, are the marginal effects 
of each variable. These coefficients should be interpreted as the change in the probability of 
  15default due to a change in the corresponding variable, assuming that all other independent 
variables remain at their mean values
36.  
 
5.1 Reference Model 
The first column of Table 5.1 presents our reference model which focuses on the effect of 
borrowers’ past performance in the credit market.  The variables included are previous 
defaults, previous missed payments, previous restructures and renewals, length of 
participation length in the market, consolidated debt, current loan amount, collateral and 
control variables for bank (that provided the loan), State of borrower’s residence, 
borrowers’ economic activity and loans’ currency of denomination. For presentation 
convenience, we only report the marginal effects of some control variables
37.  
We see in Model 1 that all historical variables have the expected sign and most of them are 
significant. Having defaulted on a previous loans is highly significant and increases PD by 
30 percentage points (pp). This is by far the highest effect on PD. Having missed payments 
in the past and having restructured a loan (both significant at 1%) increase PD in 1 and 0.01 
pp, respectively. Length of participation in the market (significant at 1%) reduces PD in 
0.01 pp while loan renewals are not significant.   
Although the expected sign was uncertain, both initial loan amount and consolidated debt 
significantly reduce the PD. Starting from the mean loan value of 1,147,910 pesos, an 
increase of 100,000 pesos of loan amount diminishes PD in 1.8 pp. Similarly, from the 
mean value of consolidated debt of 5,806,200 pesos, an increase of 100,000 pesos reduces 
PD in 0.07 pp. It is interesting to notice that loans denominated in UDIS and in dollars 
(both significant at 1% level) meant a reduction of PD in 0.56 and 0.06 pp, respectively. 
Although the variable collateral is hardly significant (at 10%), it reduces PD in 0.02 pp. 
Finally, the average PD estimated with this model is 3.97%. 
 
                                                 
36 The models were corrected for the presence of heteroskedasticity. See Appendix 3 for an explanation. 
37 The coefficients that we do not report are bank, state and economic activity. Complete estimations are 
available upon request. 
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VARIABLES MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 MODEL 5
0.30621 *** 0.31063 *** 0.30225 *** 0.30983 *** 0.30587 ***
(0.04195) (0.0422) (0.04234) (0.04166) (0.04205)
0.01037 *** 0.01029 *** 0.00987 *** 0.01054 *** 0.01003 ***
(0.02889) (0.0289) (0.02882) (0.02869) (0.02860)
0.00098 *** 0.00091 *** 0.00050 * 0.00102 *** 0.00053 *
(0.07870) (0.07892) (0.07835) (0.07827) (0.07791)
-0.00023  -0.00029  -0.00023   -0.00020   -0.00021  
(0.10375) (0.10376) (0.10373) (0.10319) (0.10315)
-0.00010 *** -0.00010 *** -0.00009 *** -0.00010 *** -0.00009 ***
(0.00184) (0.00185) (0.00184) (0.00183) (0.00183)
-7.25E-09 *** -7.11E-09 *** -6.80E-09 *** -7.32E-09 *** -6.86E-09 ***
(0.00000) (0.0000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000)
-1.80E-07 *** -1.79E-07 *** -1.66E-07 *** -1.14E-07 *** -1.04E-07 ***
(0.00001) (0.0000) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001)
-0.00026 * -0.00027 * -0.00027 * -0.00024   -0.00025 *
(0.04944) (0.0495) (0.04944) (0.04921) (0.04921)
0.00676 *** 0.00673 ***
(0.16786) (0.16726)
-0.00049 *** -0.00046 ***
(0.03875) (0.03867)
-0.00062 *** -0.00061 *** -0.00055 *** -0.00056 *** -0.00050 ***
(0.05561) (0.0556) (0.05563) (0.05564) (0.05566)
-0.00565 *** -0.00537 *** -0.00519 *** -0.00561 *** -0.00515 ***




Num. Obs. 90552 90552 90552 90552 90552
Log-Lik Intercept Only: -15099.203 -15099.203 -15099.203 -15099.203 -15099.203
Log-Lik Full Model: -5554.383 -5545.143 -5478.704 -5539.256 -5464.553
Count R2:      0.981      0.981      0.981      0.980      0.981
Adj Count R2: 0.511 0.512 0.516 0.507 0.512
AIC:      0.125      0.124      0.123      0.124      0.123
BIC: -1.021e+06 -1.021e+06 -1.022e+06 -1.021e+06 -1.022e+06
UDIS Denomination
Technological Trend

















5.2. Other hypothesis 
Model 2 adds a time variable in order to capture technological effects on PD determination. 
We would have expected that technological improvements in information gathering and 
processing would have tended to reduce the PD. We find that the time trend is highly 
significant and has a negative sign but it has a small effect on PD. The relevance of 
historical variables remains practically unchanged. 
Balance sheet information has been always considered the most important determinant of 
PD. In order to analyze the relevance of historical variables when controlling for balance 
  17sheet information, in Models 3, 4 and 5 we introduced the appropriated proxy. Model 3 
includes the variable that represents individual loans interest rates, which accounts for all 
the information that the bank had to use to set the rate. As expected, this variable increases 
the PD in a significant way. A marginal increase of interest rate above its mean value (of 
0.0127) increases the PD in 0.6 pp.
38 In Model 4 the proxy variable is a dummy that 
represents large and small firms. The size of the firm would be a proxy for sales. We find 
that the dummy is significant and that increasing the size of the firms reduces the PD in 
0.05 pp.
39 Finally, Model 5 includes both proxy variables simultaneously. Both of them 
remain highly significant and have the right signs. The relevance of the latter exercises is 
that historical variables remain highly significant and their coefficients are robust even 
when we control for balance sheet information. Hence, it is likely that models that are 
based exclusively on balance sheet information and that leave out historical behavior 
variables may be miss specified. 
The richness of our data set allowed us to test a set of other hypothesis that are presented in 
Table 5.2. To the best of our knowledge, the effect of macroeconomic variables, like 
inflation and output growth, on PD determination at the loan level had not been measured 
before. Model 1 indicates that inflation increases PD in 3.69 pp while economic growth 
reduces PD in 0.31 pp. In Model 2 we introduced an economy wide interest rate
40 to see its 
effect over PD; we find that it increases PD in 0.18 pp. Inflation usually implies higher 
interest rates. However, their changes may not coincide in time; hence they may be 
capturing different effects on PD. In Model 3 we introduced them together. Both, inflation 
and economy wide interest rate, are significant and increase PD. This results show that the 
macroeconomic environment affects individual loans’ PD in a significant manner; hence, 
macroeconomic stability and growth are necessary condition to achieve a sound financial 
system. 
                                                 
38 As it was explained before, this variable is obtained by averaging out the monthly interest payments of each 
particular loan. However, only around half of the loans reported monthly payments. In this exercise, the loans 
that did not reported an interest rate were assigned a zero interest rate. We performed an additional exercise in 
which we assigned the average interest rate to the  loans that had not reported it. This variable was also 
significant and increased the PD in 0.55 pp. 
39 The dummy variable was based on an initial loan amount threshold value of 500,000 pesos. However, we 
performed another exercise with another dummy based on a threshold value of 750,000 pesos. The outcome 
was practically the same. 
40 This variable is not the interest rate charged per loan used before, but an economy wide interest rate. We  
used  the 28 days interbank equilibrium interest rate (TIIE 28). 
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Table 5.2 
MODEL 3  VARIABLES  MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 4
*** 
Previous Default 
0.30322 *** 0.30637 *** 0.30312 *** 0.30606
(0.04270)  (0.04238) (0.04271) (0.04251)
***  Previously Missed   0.01004 *** 0.01020 *** 0.01026 0.00974 ***
Payments  (0.02908)  (0.02872) (0.02895) (0.02904)
      Restructures 
0.00039 0.00042 0.00036 0.00053 *
   
(0.07882)  (0.07856) (0.07876) (0.07818)
      Renewals 
-0.00028 -0.00020 -0.00024 -0.00023
     
(0.10403)  (0.10262) (0.10385) (0.10408)
*** 
Length of Participation 
-0.00009 *** -0.00009 *** -0.00009 *** -0.00009
(0.00185)  (0.00183) (0.00185) (0.00185)
-6.71E-09  *** 
Total Debt 
-6.66E-09 *** -6.58E-09 *** -6.89E-09 ***
(0.00000)  (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000)
-1.71E-07  *** 
Initial Loan Amount 
-1.23E-07 *** -1.67E-07 *** -1.72E-07 ***
(0.00001)  (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001)
** 
Collateral 
-0.00027 * -0.00030 * -0.00030 -0.00026 *
(0.04954)  (0.04957) (0.04947) (0.04909)
(0.00690)  *** 
Loan Interest Rate 
(0.00665) *** (0.00685) *** (0.00688) ***
(0.16819)  (0.16743) (0.16774) (0.16836)
*** 
Dollar Denomination 
-0.00054 *** -0.00057 *** -0.00056 -0.00056 ***
(0.05568)  (0.05558) (0.05570) (0.05517)
*** 
UDIS Denomination 
-0.00516 *** -0.00481 *** -0.00517 *** -0.00488
(0.18123)  (0.17718) (0.18077) (0.17927)
  




-(0.00319)  *** 
Output Growth 
-(0.00310) *** -(0.00372) ***
(0.33564)  (0.33311) (0.33169)
(0.00156)  ***  Change in Economy Wide   (0.00179) ***  
Interest Rate  (0.09200)  (0.09005)




Interaction = Initial Amount   (0.00000) ***
* Commercial Dummy 
(0.00009)
***significant at the 1%, ** significant at the 5%, * significant at the 10%
GOODNESS OF FIT 
//Degrees of Freedom 
Num. Obs.  90552 90552 90552 90552
Log-Lik Intercept Only:  -15105.538  -15105.538 -15105.538 -15099.203
Log-Lik Full Model:  -5438.885  -5456.134 -5446.67 -5460.825
Count R2:       0.981      0.981      0.981      0.981
Adj Count R2:  0.515 0.516 0.518 0.519
AIC:       0.122      0.122      0.122      0.123
BIC:  -1.022e+06  -1.022e+06 -1.022e+06 -1.022e+06
 
 
The last hypothesis that we test, is whether PD behaves differently for commercial and for 
personal loans. As we have mentioned before, the only personal loans included in the 
database are mortgages, which represent around 51% of the sample. We separated personal 
and commercial loans by means of a dummy variable which takes the value of 0 if  the loan 
  19is commercial and 1 if it is a mortgage. The coefficient turns out to be non significant. 
Nevertheless, we interacted this dummy variable with loan amount in order to determine if 
changes in loan amount affect mortgages differently than commercial loans. The coefficient 
of this variable is highly significant and negative, which means that the drop in PD as loan 
amount increases is higher for mortgages than for commercial loans
41. 
 
6.  Conclusions and Policy Issues 
rs’ past behavior is essential in the 
plications. It is clear that institutions to share information 
                                                
We have shown that information on borrowe
determination of individual loans’ PD. In particular, if a borrower had past defaults or past 
missing payments, her current loan’s PD increases dramatically. Having participated in the 
credit market in the past, as well as loan amount and total debt within the banking system, 
reduce PD significantly. These results remain significant after controlling for a number of 
variables, like balance sheet information and technological change. Our data base allowed 
us to test a number of relevant effects on probability of default. Among them, the impact of 
macroeconomic stability and growth; we find that while inflation increases loan’s PD, 
economic growth reduces it.  
This study has several policy im
are vital for a sound credit system. It is irrelevant the institutional origin –public or private- 
of the sharing mechanism. Hence, our analysis suggests that greater effort should be 
invested to conform larger and more complete databases on individuals credit history. 




41 The lack of significance of the dummy’s coefficient means that the PD distribution of commercial loans and 
mortgages have the same mean. This may be related to  the restriction on the initial amount of loans (25 
million pesos) that we imposed. However, the variance of the two distributions differ; mortgages distribution 
registers a significantly smaller variance than commercial loans. 
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(1)       
Loans    
(#) 
(2)          
% of Total 
loans 








Total Number of Loans  90,805 100.0  3,588  4.0 
Collateralized loans  54,892 60.5  1,877  3.4 
Borrowers with:             
    Previous Non-Performing Loans  5,901 6.5  3,013  51.1 
    Previous Missing Payments  3,309 3.6  1,198  36.2 
    Previous Restructures  980 1.1  156  15.9 
    Previous Renewals  1,418 1.6  61  4.3 
 
Table A.2 
   Total Number of Loans  Defaulted Loans 
Market Participation 
(1)    Number 
of loans 
(2)           
(%) of Total 
loans 
(3)           
Non-
Performing  
(4)=(3)/(1)     
(%) of Loans 
   Total Number of Loans  90,805 100.0  3,588  100.0 
First market participation  69,863  76.9 2,882 80.3 
Previous market participation  20,942 23.1  706  19.7 
 
Table A.3 
   Total loans  Non-performing loans 








Pesos  60,610 66.7  3,289  91.7  5.4 
Dollars  7,857 8.7  292  8.1  3.7 
UDIS  22,338 24.6  7  0.2  0.03 
Total  90,805  100.0 3,558 100.0  4.0 
 
 
  23Table A.4  
   Loans Non-performing  Loans 
Bank  #  (%) of Total Loans  # 
(%) of Bank 
Loans 
Bank 1  29,124 32.1  1,025  3.5 
Bank 2  22,022 24.3  806  3.7 
Bank 3  9,857 10.9  660  6.7 
Bank 4  9,117 10.0  119  1.3 
Bank 5  4,363 4.8  196  4.5 
Bank 6  4,057 4.5  190  4.7 
Other 30 banks  12,265 14  592  4.8 
Total  90,805 100.0  3,588  4.0 
 
Table A.5 
   Loans Non-performing  Loans 
Economic Activity  #  (%) of Total Loans # 
(%) of Activity 
Loans 
Housing (21)  47,053 51.8  1,447  3.1 
Professional Services (18)  7,028 7.7  321  4.6 
Finished products trade (3)   5,804 6.4  285  4.9 
Raw materials and machinery trade (4)  4,852 5.3  209  4.3 
Agriculture (1)  3,665 4.0  305  8.3 
Other 17 activities  22,403 25  1,021  4.6 
Total  90,805 100.0  3,588 4.0 
 
Table A.6 
   Loans Non-performing  Loans 
State # 
(%) of Total 
Loans # 
(%) of State 
Loans 
Federal District (9)  32,351 36.0  606  1.9 
Nuevo Leon (19)  10,497 12  536  5.1 
Estado de Mexico (15)  5,235 6  129  2.5 
Jalisco (14)  6,254 7  369  5.9 
Guanajuato (11)  3,370 4  116  3.4 
Other 27 states  33,098 36  1,832  5.5 
Total  90,805 100  3,588  4.0 
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Appendix  2 
Economic Activities 
1 Agriculture 
2  Livestock, fishing and hunting 
3  Extraction of coal, graphite, oil, natural gas, minerals and salt.   
4  Food, beverages and tobacco  
5  Textiles and apparel includes leather industries 
6  Cork, wood and paper products 
7 Chemical  industry 
8  Fabrication of rubber, plastic and non-metallic minerals  
9 Basic  metallic  industries 
10  Manufacturing, assembling and repairs of machinery and equipment 
11  Other manufacturing industries  
12 Construction   
13  Clothing and home products retail trade   
14  Gas, fuels, lubricants, raw materials, machinery and transportation equipment trade 
15  Real estate retail trade  
16  Communications and transport  
17  Financial services, insurance and leasing  
18  Professional and technical services 
19  Commerce, restaurants and hotels 
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In Probit models, the presence of heteroskedasticity, represents a more serious problem 
than in OLS since the estimated parameters become inconsistent. We use Harvey’s general 





























where  is the vector of explanatory variables that belong to the conditional variance 
specification and
i z
γˆ is the vector of estimated coefficients; the general formulation for the 
conditional variance is the following: 
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Notice that   includes the variables that may be causing the heteroskedasticity. In our 
case, we considered that both, initial loan amount   and the type of loan  could be 
generating the problem. To capture for the latter, we included the dummy variable that 
separates commercial loans from mortgages  . We also introduced in the conditional 
variance estimation the interaction between these variables  .  
i z
) ( i X
) ( i D
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Given that our model corrects for heteroskedasticity, we use the following set of 
expressions to compute the marginal effects (2000, p.830), assuming that we are dealing 
with a continuous independent variable , which could appear in  ,   or both:  k w i x i z
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The appropriate marginal effect for a binary independent variable, d, would be computed as 
follows: 
[] [] 0 *, *, 1 Prob 1 *, *, 1 Prob
) 1 ( Prob
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Goodness of Fit Measures (taken from Long and Freese, 2001) 
For binary dependent variable models the pseudo-R2 goodness of fit measures are usually 
reported. However, these measures are not relevant in the presence of heteroskedasticity. 
The appropriated goodness of fit measures for this setting are constructed by testing the 
model predicted probabilities against the actual dichotomous dependent variable. Such 
measures are count and adjusted count R
2. We also report the Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC) used in model selection for non-nested alternatives; this criterion states that the 
smaller AIC values the better the model. Finally, we report the Bayesian information 
criterion (BIC) which has been proposed as a measure of overall fit; the more negative the 
BIC, the better the fit. In the following paragraphs we describe these measures. 
Count and adjusted count R
2  Observed and predicted values can be used to compute the 
count R
2. Consider the binary case where the observed y is 0 or 1 and   
Define the expected outcome as 
). / 1 ( Pr i i x y = =
∧
π
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where the njj’s are the number of correct predictions for outcome j. The count R
2 can give 
the faulty impression that the model is predicting very well.  In a binary model without 
knowledge about the independent variables, it is possible to correctly predict at least 50 
percent of the cases by choosing the outcome category with the largest percentage of 













where nr+ is the marginal for row r. The adjusted count R
2 is the proportion of correct 
guesses beyond the number that would be correctly guessed by choosing the largest 
marginal. 
Information measures  This class of measures can be used to compare models across 
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where  is the likelihood of the model and P is the number of parameters in the model 
(e.g., K + 1 in the binary regression model where K is the number of regressors).  All else 
being equal, the model with the smaller AIC is considered the better fitting model.   
( k M L
∧
)
  27The BIC was proposed by Raftery (1996) as a measure of overall fit and a means to 
compare nested and non-nested models. Consider the model  with deviance  . 
BIC is defined as 
k M ) ( k M D
N df M D BIC k k k ln ) ( − =  
where  is the degrees of freedom associated with the deviance. The difference in the BIC 
from the two models indicates which model is more likely to have generated the observed 
data. If  , then the first model is preferred. If 
k df
0 2 1 < − BIC BIC 0 2 1 > − BIC BIC , then the 
second model is preferred. 
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